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Abstract 
 
In this article, the implications of foregrounding ontology for teaching and learning in higher 
education are explored. In conventional approaches to higher education programs, ontology has 
tended to be subordinated to epistemological concerns. This has meant the flourishing of notions 
such as transfer and acquisition of knowledge and skills, either generic or discipline-specific. The 
authors challenge this emphasis on what students acquire through education by foregrounding 
instead the question of who they become. They do this through a theoretical/conceptual 
exploration of an approach to learning that undermines a narrow focus on the intellect by 
promoting the integration of knowing, acting and being. 
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1. Challenges to conventional university programs 
 
In the higher education research literature during the past decade, the idea and role of the 
university has featured prominently. While this issue is by no means new (e.g., Jaspers, 
1960; Ortega y Gasset, 1944; Reeves, 1988), it has received renewed attention. Several 
researchers have noted a changed role for the university, challenging current 
conceptualisations of what a university is or should strive to be (e.g., Barnett, 1997, 2000, 
2005; Bowden & Marton, 2004; Coffield & Williamson, 1997; Delanty, 2001; Dall’Alba 
& Barnacle, 2005; Gibbons et al., 1994; Readings, 1996; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). The 
fragmentation of the university in line with hyper-specialisation, a focus on knowledge 
rather than learning, and the largely instrumental function universities are seen to have 
within contemporary societies are among the points of contention identified.  
 
Current critiques of higher education typically raise issues previously identified by 
Martin Heidegger, who questioned the way in which we “increasingly instrumentalize, 
professionalize, vocationalize, corporatize, and ultimately technologize education” 
(Thomson, 2001, p. 244; emphasis in original). These trends within contemporary 
universities can be seen in an emphasis on ‘quality assurance’ and accountability (for 
instance, in throughput measures such as completions); increased marketing of university 
programs locally, nationally, and internationally; and areas of study showing strong 
student demand or attributed high status. 
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In parallel with challenges to the idea and role of the university, an emphasis on transfer 
and acquisition of knowledge and skills in university programs has been extensively 
questioned. The epistemology underlying such an emphasis has been demonstrated to be 
fundamentally flawed (e.g., (Billett, 2001; Bourdieu, 1977; Chaiklin & Lave, 1993; 
Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005; Dall’Alba & Sandberg, 1996; Giddens, 1984, 1993; Lave, 
1993; Schön, 1983; van Manen, 1977). Within this epistemology, knowledge and skills 
are seen as attributes that can be decontextualised from the practices to which they relate. 
For instance, anatomy and communication skills are often taught as self-contained 
components of a medical program. Such trends are also evident within research degrees, 
which have until recently remained somewhat insulated from the generic capabilities 
push, but where attention has now turned to including generic skills programs. While 
there are exceptions to conventional curriculum design, programs emphasising 
knowledge and skills acquisition remain prevalent. Their design raises the question of 
how such knowledge and skills are to be integrated into skilful practice or, more broadly, 
contribute to the transformation of the learner, as we argue below.  
 
As a further challenge to decontextualised knowledge, the notion of knowledge as 
foundational and absolute has been vigorously contested (Grosz, 1995; Gibbons et al, 
1994; Lave, 1993; Schön, 1983). A transformation and pluralisation has occurred, such 
that knowledge has come to be seen as situated and localised into various 'knowledges' 
that are socially constructed in relation to specific knowledge interests. This 
transformation and pluralisation further calls into question the notion of an unproblematic 
knowledge transfer or acquisition.  
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While an emphasis on knowledge transfer or acquisition has been challenged 
epistemologically, there is also considerable empirical evidence that such an emphasis is 
inadequate in promoting student learning (Brockbank & McGill, 1998; Brown & Glasner, 
1999; Ramsden, 2003; Walker, 2001). This is because a focus on knowledge, rather than 
learning, treats learning as unproblematic. More particularly, students are not assisted and 
supported in situating and localising knowledge within specific manifestations of 
practice. A focus on knowledge acquisition leaves to students the difficult task of 
integrating such knowledge into practice.  
 
Not only have the nature of knowledge and knowledge transfer been challenged, but 
knowledge as the focus of higher education has come into question, albeit a conventional 
notion of knowledge (e.g., Barnett, 2000, 2004; Bowden & Marton, 2004; Dall’Alba, 
1998; Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005; Dall’Alba & Sandberg, 1996). Consistent with 
foregrounding knowledge, an over-emphasis on a narrow conception of the intellect is 
evident in many higher education programs (Barnett, 1997; Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005).  
 
In contrast to the emphasis on the intellect in conventional higher education programs, 
the embodiment of knowledge has received renewed attention in epistemological debates 
and empirical research. For instance, the centrality of the embodiment of knowledge and 
the ‘lived body’ have been identified in professional practice (Dall’Alba & Sandberg, 
2006; Mol, 2002) and in body-technology relations (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005; 
Heidegger, 1993/1978; Ihde, 2002), while feminist researchers have highlighted the 
 5 
gendered nature of the embodiment of knowledge (Grosz, 1995). While some attention is 
being paid to the embodiment of knowledge as it relates to children and teenagers in 
schools (see, for example, Bresler, 2004), little research on higher education has 
highlighted its importance. It is evident that a focus on the intellect in conventional 
higher education programs overlooks the key role of the lived body and, more 
specifically, the embodiment of knowledge, or knowing.  
 
This paper draws together aspects of these debates in exploring an alternative, ontological 
conceptualisation of learning for higher education programs. Educational approaches that 
focus on the intellect render irrelevant or invisible the necessary commitment, openness, 
wonder, or passion that are integral to learning or to taking action, more broadly. These 
are among the dimensions of learning that we believe need to be revitalised through an 
ontological approach to higher education programs. Here we present a 
theoretical/conceptual account of the role of ontology in these programs. Our approach 
offers a way forward for higher education by re-asserting the ontological implications of 
learning, which in the past have tended to be subordinated to epistemological concerns. 
 
 
2. Knowing and being are interdependent 
 
Our point of departure is Heidegger’s insight that the problems faced by higher 
education, such as those outlined above, are ontological. Iain Thomson, enunciating 
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Heidegger’s position, argues there is an essential link between education and ontology, in 
that our approach to the latter will be reflected in how we treat the former: 
 
When our understanding of what beings are changes historically, our understanding of what 
‘education’ is transforms as well (2001, p. 248; emphasis in original). 
 
Heidegger addresses ontological questions phenomenologically or, in other words, 
through attending to our everyday being in the world. This reveals that our mode of being 
in the world is that of dwelling with and amongst things and others. While this may 
sound in some respects obvious, according to Heidegger it is an obviousness that has 
been lost to us since ancient Greek times. What it means is that we don’t primarily access 
things conceptually or intellectually but, instead, through being constantly immersed in 
activities, projects and practices with things and others. We organise entities and 
creatures within these projects: breed livestock and prepare food for our families, for 
example. We also alter or construct things, such as fell trees and build houses, or re-orient 
streams and rivers. To be this way requires that we are open to the possibilities of things 
– the qualities of timber or fresh produce, for example, and what those qualities enable. 
Things, in turn, need to be receptive to our manipulations. Heidegger calls this our 
situatedness, ‘always already’ open to the possibilities of being (see Building, Dwelling 
Thinking, 1993/1978). Because we are also historical creatures, however, the way things 
appear to us—what we consider things to be and what they can be used for—is informed 
by the parameters of intelligibility that are inherent in growing up in a particular social 
and historical context.  
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Knowing, or how we understand the world, thus arises on the cusp between the history of 
being—or how being has been thought in the past—and the possibilities of being that are 
opened up in our everyday practices, projects and activities. In other words, what is—
including how things become what they are—and what we know are mutually dependent: 
ontology and epistemology are inseparable. For Thomson: 
 
Our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody. [There 
is] a troubling sense in which it seems that we cannot help practicing what we know, since we are 
‘always already’ implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical presuppositions. (Thomson, 2001, p. 
250) 
 
If being and knowing are inextricable, then exploring this interdependence provides a 
means of not only problematising but also transforming higher education. Knowing is 
inhabited; we cannot step outside it. But it is also transformative—it can change who we 
are. 
 
In contrast to the Heideggerian account described above, representationalist models have 
dominated accounts of what it means to know since the enlightenment. The tendency 
persists to think of the things that inhere in the world—entities and materiality broadly—
as passive receptacles for, or products of, thought or discourse. In such an approach, 
materiality is always thought of as subject to, rather than productive of, signification. 
While it has been the subject of critique for some time, particularly within the spectrum 
of Continental philosophy, representationalism endures. But we need not accept this. For 
example, Karen Barad challenges such models in asking: 
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What compels the belief that we have a direct access to cultural representations and their content 
that we lack toward the thing represented? How did language come to be more trustworthy than 
matter? Why are language and culture granted their own agency and historicity while matter is 
figured as passive and immutable?… How does one even go about inquiring after the material 
conditions that have led us to such a brute reversal of naturalist beliefs when materiality itself is 
always already figured within a linguistic domain as its condition of possibility? (2003, p. 801) 
 
Alternative accounts of knowing can be mobilised by challenging the idea that mind and 
reason occupy a privileged and detached stance in relation to the body and world, more 
broadly. Where a conventional account of knowing has treated it as restricted to an ideal 
realm of thoughts, ideas and concepts, we want to situate knowing within the materiality, 
and spatial and temporal specificity, of being-in-the-world. In other words, knowing is 
not reducible to thought or the discursive. Instead, knowing is always situated within a 
personal, social, historical and cultural setting, and thus transforms from the merely 
intellectual to something inhabited and enacted: a way of thinking, making and acting. 
Indeed, a way of being. 
 
In putting forward this argument, it is not our intention to dismiss formal knowledge or to 
suggest that learning of this kind should be abandoned. Rather, what needs to be 
recognised, in our view, is that formal or propositional knowledge and the informal kind 
of knowing that emerges out of being-in-the-world are interrelated. Hubert Dreyfus 
(2004) makes a similar point by arguing that an embodied directedness to the world not 
only forms the basis for all formalised propositional knowledge, but that the emergence 
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of new ideas and new ways of doing things is dependent on a less codified, embodied, 
engagement with the world.  
 
Although ontological issues of the kind explored here have not previously featured 
prominently in debates about the state of higher education, attention is now being paid to 
the ontological nature of the problems being faced (Barnett, 2000, 2004, 2005; Dall’Alba 
& Barnacle, 2005). Ronald Barnett (2004, 2005) speaks of a need for an ‘ontological 
turn’ in teaching within higher education, while acknowledging that epistemology is not 
thereby entirely displaced. He argues that “instead of knowing the world, being-in-the-
world has to take primary place in the conceptualizations that inform university teaching” 
(Barnett, 2005, p. 795). In line with Heidegger, Barnett proposes that an ontological turn 
of this kind offers a way forward for higher education institutions. Below we explore 
what it means to explicitly incorporate ontology in this way through a reconceptualised 
notion of learning.  
 
 
3. Reconceptualising learning 
 
The broader conceptualisation of higher education that we explore here has the potential 
to transform the notion of learning in higher education, as well as the way in which such 
learning would be promoted and realised within higher education institutions. Knowledge 
remains important, but the focus is no longer knowledge transfer or acquisition. Instead, 
knowing is understood as created, embodied, and enacted. In other words, the question 
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for students would be not only what they know, but also who they are becoming. Rather 
than treating knowledge as information that can be accumulated within a (disembodied) 
mind, learning becomes understood as the development of embodied ways of knowing or, 
in other words, ways-of-being (Dall’Alba, 2004, 2005). 
 
In our conceptualisation of learning, there is a shift in focus from epistemology in itself to 
epistemology in the service of ontology (see Dall’Alba, 2005, for elaboration). In other 
words, learning is not confined to the heads of individuals, but involves integrating ways 
of knowing, acting, and being within a broad range of practices. For instance, teacher 
education programs would not only address specific knowledge and skills that teachers 
need. Such programs would also focus on developing appropriate ways of enacting 
opportunities and situations as educational, that is, developing ways of being skilful 
teachers such that student learning is enhanced. Similarly, for medical students, learning 
to know sicknesses and symptoms, in an embodied sense, would contribute to developing 
appropriate ways of acting towards patients, their friends and family, as well as relevant 
authorities and so on, in a manner that promotes improved health for patients. In other 
words, the focus of medical programs would be developing appropriate ways of being 
medical practitioners, in contrast to simply acquiring and applying knowledge of 
relevance to medicine. Rather than the current focus on generic skills in research degree 
programs, undertaking a doctorate would be understood as learning ways of being that 
are appropriate to research within a particular field or discipline (Barnacle, 2005). This 
recognises that practices of knowledge production, including how knowledge is 
organised and generated, are contingent upon traditions of knowledge. Becoming a 
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researcher involves entering into these ways of thinking, acting and being. It is precisely 
because ways of thinking etc become inhabited that it can be difficult to challenge 
familiar frames of intelligibility. 
 
While we argue for a focus on developing ways of being in higher education programs, 
this does not mean social engineering in which all ‘products’ of a higher education 
program should, or could, be identical. Such a proposal contrasts sharply with our 
position. Rather, by virtue of the fact that they are educational enterprises, higher 
education programs promote—directly or indirectly—particular ways of knowing, acting 
and being.  As these programs have an educative role, the development of appropriate 
ways of being, acting and knowing is, arguably, defensible. 
 
What, then, would a focus on developing ways of being mean for higher education? 
Heidegger (1998/1967a) points to the original meaning of the German word, Bildung 
(education or formation), as “turning around the whole human being. It means removing 
human beings from the region where they first encounter things and transferring and 
accustoming them to another realm where beings appear” (p. 167).1 First, we note 
Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology, that is, being-in-the-world. Second, we see an 
inevitable embeddedness within the surrounding world, that is, being-in-the-world. Third, 
Heidegger is critical of thought that “may be levelled out into the uniform storage of 
information and as such made useful for the inevitable planning needed by a humanity  
                                                
1 Heidegger (1998/1967a) indicates the kind of education or formation he is proposing through a 
reinterpretation of Plato’s ‘allegory of the cave.’ By ‘turning around the whole human being’ there is an 
awakening to the ‘realm where beings appear’ in their unconcealed form. 
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under control” (Heidegger, 1998/1967b, p. xiii). The alignment of such thought with an 
increasingly instrumentalised higher education is evident in the trends we noted earlier.  
Fourth, Heidegger makes clear that he does not mean:  
 
…merely pouring knowledge into the unprepared soul [or mind] as if it were some container held 
out empty and waiting. On the contrary real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in 
its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it. 
(1998/1967a, p. 167) 
 
As we discussed earlier, for Heidegger, the way that things appear—what we think things 
are and what we do with them—emerges through our being-in-the-world. It is the role of 
education to re-engage us with this process.  In other words, according to Thomson, 
education serves “to bring us full circle back to ourselves, first by turning us away from 
the world in which we are most immediately immersed, then by turning us back to this 
world in a more reflexive way” (2001, p. 254).  
 
What are the means at our disposal for bringing about such a transformation within 
higher education? Some of the means at our disposal are evident in the nature of the 
transformation itself. In other words, the how and what of education are consistent. 
Heidegger’s description of ‘Bildung’ points to one means for achieving such 
transformation, namely, “removing human beings from the region where they first 
encounter things.” This would mean creating space and opportunities for students to 
encounter the familiar in unfamiliar ways. Through the strange and unfamiliar we engage 
with difference: the possibility that things could be otherwise. In other words, by 
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considering the taken-for-granted from other perspectives, we can develop new ways of 
dealing with our world. In a similar vein, Barnett argues for presenting ‘awkward spaces 
to and for students’ (2005, p. 795) in order to enable them to deal with the ‘strangeness’ 
they inevitably encounter in an uncertain and unpredictable world.  
 
A second means at our disposal is also evident in Heidegger’s description of the kind of 
education for which we should strive, namely, “leading us to the place of our essential 
being and accustoming us to it.” Note, first, that our essential being, for Heidegger, is not 
something fixed, immutable and eternal, but instead, is simply our way of being—it refers 
to how we are rather than what we are. The implication, therefore, in the words of 
Thomson, is that: “Genuine education leads us back to ourselves, to the place we are”, it 
teaches us to dwell there, transforming us in the process (op cit, p. 254, italics in 
original). He describes this as ‘receptive spontaneity [that] Heidegger will simply call 
hearing or hearkening (hören), that is …, an attentive and responsive way of dwelling in 
one’s environment” (p. 256). Heidegger elaborates this idea when he says: “To learn 
means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us 
at a given time” (1968, p. 14).  
 
The notion of ‘receptive spontaneity’ appears to resonate with a central task and 
challenge that Barnett identifies for the contemporary university in an uncertain world. 
This task consists of enabling students to develop “the capacity to cope, to prosper and to 
delight in [such] a world” (2005, p. 794). Students are not only to learn to tolerate 
strangeness in an uncertain world, but also to produce it, “for, ultimately, the only way, 
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amid strangeness, to become fully human, to achieve agency and authenticity, is to have 
the capacity to go on producing strangeness by and for oneself” (ibid, p. 794). In 
Heidegger’s terms, this would mean having the capacity to disclose new worlds, or to 
engage with beings in new and appropriate ways. Clearly, such a task will not be realised 
simply through knowledge transfer or acquisition. Instead, the integration of knowing, 
acting and being is essential to its realisation.  
 
Not only are opportunities for developing receptive spontaneity and for encountering the 
familiar in unfamiliar ways necessary for students, but also for university teachers and, 
arguably, higher education institutions as a whole. In order to be attentive and responsive 
to the needs of students, teachers in higher education must turn away from immediate 
demands to reflexively examine the what and how of university teaching. What is its goal 
and purpose in relation to students and contemporary society? How can this goal and 
purpose be achieved in meaningful and responsive ways?  
 
An ontological turn has the potential to offer a way forward that enables teachers to 
address current concerns about higher education in line with receptive spontaneity. As 
Heidegger points out, such a response necessitates ‘dwelling in one’s environment’ in 
order to ‘answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time.’ Making 
university teaching ‘unfamiliar’ in this way is crucial to its renewal (Dall’Alba, 2005). 
Barnett, too, recognises this need in advocating critical professionalism among university 
teachers (1997, p. 132). 
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Similarly, higher education institutions are in need of continual renewal in order to 
adequately ‘answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time.’ In 
exploring new responses to the current instrumentalisation and technologisation of higher 
education, a reflexive turn is essential. As Barnett argues: 
 
A climate of collective self-criticality has to be developed as a continuing feature of university life. 
If a university is to fulfil its responsibilities as a ‘university’ to the world by offering a space for 
strangeness, it needs also to accommodate to strangeness in its own midst, especially a continuing 
strangeness about itself. (2005, p. 795) 
 
We argue, then, for a revitalisation of higher education in order to address the kind of 
concerns outlined in the introduction to this paper. In our view, an ontological and 
reflexive turn is needed to adequately address these concerns at all levels of higher 
education institutions. More specifically, we argue for a shift in focus from knowledge 
transfer or acquisition to ways of being. Continually and thoughtfully monitoring and 
evaluating the extent to which we bring about such a shift is a necessary feature of its 
achievement if higher education institutions are to demonstrate responsive spontaneity. 
 
 
4. Implications for higher education programs 
 
If we conceptualise knowing and learning in the ways outlined above, what implications 
does this have for higher education programs and, more specifically, for enhancing 
teaching and learning? An ontological turn provides a way of addressing a number of 
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shortfalls in current higher education programs. These include: de-contextualisation of 
knowledges from the practices to which they relate, emphasis on a narrow conception of 
knowledge rather than learning, over-emphasis on the intellect, and a focus on 
epistemology at the expense of ontology.  
 
We argue above that epistemology must be in the service of ontology in higher education 
programs. The task is incomplete with mere knowledge acquisition. Instead, higher 
education programs need to re-orient their focus by assisting students to integrate 
knowing, acting and being. In so doing, emphasis is placed on learning and its 
enhancement, not on knowledge in itself.  
 
While such a shift includes enacting practice, it does not imply a focus on skills 
acquisition (see also van Manen, 1977). As Nigel Blake and colleagues note, a common 
propensity to reduce a range of human abilities and qualities, such as teaching, 
communicating, and parenting, to ‘skills’ or ‘competencies’ overlooks the engagement, 
commitment and risk involved: “what are commonly called skills are not activities to 
which we give anything of ourselves” (2000, p. 26). Indeed, without commitment, or 
caring about the outcome, the development of important skills, like those above, is 
unlikely to occur at all. In other words, a narrow focus on skills undermines skilfulness 
itself because it fails to integrate knowing, acting and being.  
 
Similarly, our notion of learning does not simply imply learning by doing. As Pirkko 
Markula points out, “the engagement in bodily practices or promotion of bodily practices 
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does not alone guarantee the construction of an embodied subjectivity” (2004, p. 74). At 
the same time, Minette Mans points out that “bodies in performance always enfold and 
reveal diverse histories of gender, social status, kinship, ethnicity and power as well as 
the bodily experience” (Mans, 2004, p. 79). These complex interrelationships are 
inevitably incorporated into an integration of knowing-acting-being, including the 
opportunities, diversity, prejudices, and limitations that the interrelationships entail. 
Developing awareness of these interrelationships among students and teachers while 
promoting the integration of knowing, acting, and being is part of the task of higher 
education.  
 
If a shift in focus from knowledge and skills to the development of responsive ways of 
being is to be achieved, it would need to permeate higher education programs. This 
means that such a focus would be explicit in aims, curriculum design, pedagogy, 
assessment of student learning, and evaluation of teaching and courses. Such a focus 
would address both the requirements of educating individuals and preparing them for 
making a contribution to society. It embraces, then, both the educative and social 
functions of higher education. In so doing, it has the potential to provide a constructive 
basis for collaboration with stakeholders and other organisations beyond the university, 
such as employer organisations and professional bodies. 
 
In order to achieve a shift in focus to developing ways of being, what it means to 
be(come) a teacher, artist, physicist, historian, engineer, architect, and so on must be a 
central and ongoing question that continues to be addressed explicitly throughout (and 
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beyond) higher education programs. Becoming is, by definition, never complete. Instead, 
what it means to be(come) a teacher etc is dynamic and changing over time with 
developments in practice and the place of particular forms of practice in society, more 
generally. Hence, perpetually becoming in this way requires openness. There is a need to 
‘answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time’ if we, and our 
students, are to remain abreast of changes impacting upon practice. But this is not simply 
a matter of remaining up-to-date. Instead, learning to be(come) a teacher, physiotherapist 
and so on, involves transforming or ‘turning around’ the self, as Heidegger pointed out. It 
is not only a question of epistemology but, more particularly, of ontology.  
 
An outline or description of ways of being that is helpful at the program level would need 
to be directed to the practice in question, rather than generic graduate attributes or 
capabilities. For instance, there would be a need to integrate ‘critical thinking’ or 
‘effective communication’ into ways of being that are appropriate for particular practice. 
Knowing when and how to draw upon particular knowledge and skills in specific 
situations is a necessary component of such integration, but it is not sufficient. There is 
also a need to engage with ways of being embedded within traditions of practice. 
However, as noted above, practice itself evolves and becomes renewed over time. It is 
continually reproduced and renewed, so that higher education programs must 
demonstrate responsive spontaneity.  
 
Given the dynamic and complex nature of practice, there are multiple ways in which it is 
enacted (see, for example, Billett, 2001; Dall’Alba, 2002; Mol, 2002). This dynamism 
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and complexity presents a challenge when educating students to engage in practice. At 
the same time, it provides a means by which the familiar can continually be made 
unfamiliar. Allowing students to encounter and reflexively dwell in this dynamism and 
complexity is necessary to promoting attentive and responsive ways of answering to the 
situations encountered. As Barnett (2000, 2005) notes, enabling students to deal with 
such dynamism and complexity is a key role of higher education. 
 
While the learning that we advocate involves transformation of being, which is itself no 
straightforward task, teaching for such ends may be even more challenging. Heidegger 
argues that teaching is more difficult than learning in contemporary universities: 
 
Why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of 
information, and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what 
teaching calls for is this: to let learn. (1968, p. 15)2 
 
Letting learn—creating space and opportunities for learning—poses more challenges to 
teachers than the ‘decanter’ model implied by notions of knowledge transfer. In a similar 
vein, Robert Gardner points out “how hard it is to teach without sliding into views that 
exaggerate both one’s own knowledge and one’s students lack of” knowledge (1994, p. 
81). Creating space and opportunities for learning demands that we recognise and draw 
upon the commitment, openness, wonder and passion that are integral to learning. It also 
requires dealing with the resistance, prejudices, and anxieties that limit learning. Letting  
                                                
Max van Manen’s (1991) ‘tact of teaching’ also incorporates letting learn, although he does not use this 
terminology. Thomson (2005) further elaborates Heidegger’s analysis. 
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learn means that our being in the world is foregrounded, challenged, and transformed.  
 
Such an approach to teaching contrasts starkly with transmission of (decontextualised and 
disembodied) ‘knowledge’, overloaded curricula, an emphasis on accountability, and de-
professionalisation of university teachers. Instead, letting learn requires creatively 
enacting situations as pedagogical, being open to, and engaging with, the issues 
encountered, being sensitive to student needs, and promoting self-awareness and 
reflective practice, with the risks and opportunities that this entails. In other words, letting 
learn, too, demands a capacity for responsive spontaneity as a means of enhancing the 
integration of knowing, acting, and being among our students.  
 
Not only does our argument to foreground ontology have implications for higher 
education practice of the kind outlined above, but such a shift in focus also has 
implications for research on higher education. Most clearly, in research on teaching and 
learning, ontology would be addressed as well as epistemology. In addition, policy 
directions for higher education and assessments of the extent to which higher education 
institutions are fulfilling their purposes would be re-framed around an ontological 
agenda.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our aim in this paper was to put forward an argument for an ontological turn in higher 
education. Our reconceptualisation offers a way forward for addressing key problems 
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confronting teaching and learning in higher education, as identified in the introduction to 
this paper. In line with Heidegger’s identification of problems facing higher education as 
ontological, we propose a re-orientation of the higher education project. Such a re-
orientation holds the promise of revitalising higher education at a time when a 
constructive way forward is sorely needed. 
 
An ontological shift means engaging with being-in-the-world differently. As dedicated 
learning environments, higher education institutions are ideally situated to do this. Not 
only can they provide a forum for challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, but also 
promote ways of being that integrate knowing, acting and being. Indeed, educational 
institutions cannot help but promote ways of being. The question is: are those ways of 
being conducive to the kind of outcomes both students and society, more broadly, are 
seeking?  We have argued it is not enough for learners merely to understand new 
concepts or acquire new skills: this does not produce skilful practitioners. Instead, they 
are to transform as people, to become architects, psychologists, biologists etc who enact 
ways of being in the world appropriate to the practice in question that are also responsive 
to changing practice contexts. In other words, we are calling for educational approaches 
that engage the whole person: what they know, how they act, and who they are.  
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